The Experimental Years: A View from the Left by Tilbury, John
  
Contact :  A  Journa l  for  Contemporary  Mus ic  ( 1971 -1988)  
http://contactjournal.gold.ac.uk 
Citation 
     
Tilbury, John. 1981. ‘The Experimental Years: A View from the Left’. Contact, 22. pp. 16-21. 
ISSN 0308-5066.
[{]JOHN TILBURY 
The Years: A View from the Left 
INTRODUCTION 
Late in 1960 Cornelius Cardew and I gave a concert of 
music for two pianos at the Con way Hall in London. The 
programme consisted of American music - by John 
Cage, Morton Feldman and Christian Wolff - and 
music by Cardew himself. It was my first involvement in 
experimental music and the first in a series of concerts 
which Cardew and I took around to various parts of the 
country. The predominance of American music in our 
progammes was of significance; in particular it reflected 
an attitude to the past which, like that of the Americans, 
was pure and simple : we rejected it. But at the same time 
we were ignorant of it: we did not understand how the 
music of the past had come about. We knew nothing of 
the changing social role that music had played across the 
centuries. We had no grasp of the concept of class values 
in relation to art. 
The music of Cage and his followers embodied this 
anti-historical stance and naturally we took to it like fish 
to water. Personally, I had never been enamoured of the 
European avant-garde; I resented its musical dogma, its 
melodic and harmonic conventions alienated me, it seem-
ed to me to be at once academic and aggressive, and it had 
neither wit nor soul. On the other hand, and paradoxical-
ly perhaps, in Feldman's music I was strongly aware of a 
human agency at work, of an imaginative musical mind, 
and the fact that the Americans had not banned certain 
chords and progressions from their work impressed me. 
True, in the last analysis they too had created artificial 
systems, but these did not seem to 'police' the music in the 
way that European serialism did. 
For the experimentalists John Cage is the key per-
sonality whose influence cannot be overestimated, but in 
the 60s a new figure emerged in America, La Monte 
Young, who made an immediate and dramatic impact on 
the scene. Nowadays we hear only the residue and rarely 
the real thing: Young aestheticised or commercialised by 
a host of composers such as the Americans Philip Glass, 
Steve Reich and Terry Riley and, in England, Gavin 
Bryars, Christopher Hobbs, Michael Nyman and 
Michael Parsons. These are talented musicians, but the 
excitement and daring of Young's music in the 60s, to 
which they owe so much, was never recaptured during the 
70s. Naturally there were other influences, but Young's 
radical single-sound aesthetic became the springboard for 
musical experimentation: in works such as X for Henry 
Flynt ( 1960), a loud, heavy sound- usually performed as a 
large piano cluster - repeated X times, Studies in the 
Bowed Disc for a four-foot steel gong ( 1963) and The Well-
Tuned Piano (1964), each piece (or rather each 
process) consists of a characteristic sound in which the 
listener immerses himself. Young's influence has also, in 
my opinion, extended to the pop world, with devastating 
effects. 'Pioneer' groups like The Who became identified 
by their 'sound', not by the songs they performed, because 
the musical components- melody, harmony, rhythm -
were obliterated for the listener by sheer amplitude. Pop 
was a physical but hardly an auditory experience. 
Young's music contrived to be both: the listener par-
ticipated, he was not bludgeoned and rendered totally 
passive. The sounds were not only rich, complex and 
interesting; his music appealed aesthetically. People 
found beauty in it. 
It was on the crest of the 'beautiful sound wave' that 
Terry Riley emerged and achieved during the second half 
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of the decade considerable notoriety and popularity. 
Strictly speaking, Riley's music was not single-sound 
music, through like the blues it created that illusion. It 
was not radical and lacked the purity of Young's; the 
components were musically and aesthetically more con-
ventional. It thus managed to bridge the gap between the 
experimentalists and the pop world: the repetitive nature 
and harmonious quality of the music appealed to the 
experimentalists, but its language was modal (A Rainbow in 
Curved Air, 1966) and tonal (In C, 1964), it used 
electric organs and saxophones and it had a beat. Riley's 
music became an important part ofthe new 'underground 
pop' movement in the 60s. 
The Scratch Orchestra, which emerged a little later (in 
1969, out of Cardew's composition class at Morley 
College in London), was an enterprising body of per-
formers, playing all sorts of experimental music (Cage, 
Wolff, Riley, Young, Rzewski and their own works) in all 
kinds of situations for all classes of people: for Cornish 
farm-workers in village squares, for the young industrial 
workers of north-west England and for both urban and 
rural communities on the continent, as well as for the 
music lovers who frequented the Royal Festival Hall. The 
SO consisted of an assortment of people from various 
walks of life (some of them with considerable artistic 
talent) and there was no more enthusiastic, more com-
mitted and more serious collection of individuals working 
in the field of contemporary art at that time. During the 
first two years of its existence the SO's performance and 
compositional output was prolific. At the same time the 
nature and intensity of these activities engendered con-
tradictions that eventually gave rise to a crisis. Feelings of 
discontent and frustration had accumulated and finally , 
at two long and harrowing meetings in September 1971 , 
souls were bared, reasons sought and excuses offered . The 
guitarist Keith Rowe and I put forward an analysis of the 
situation, a conscious attempt to understand and explain 
our predicament. Rowe and I pinpointed a fundamental 
disunity of theory and practice in the SO as the primary 
source of discontent among its members. In theory we 
believed in integration and being gregarious, in practice 
we were isolationists and parochialists; in theory we 
rejected the musical establishment, in practice we asked 
for its support (Arts Council grants, BBC television and 
Festival Hall appearances); in theory we wished to be 'an 
instrument of inspiration', in practice we appeared to 
many as 'a pessimistic symptom of a system in decay'; 1 in 
theory we wished to build an open society, in practice we 
had created a closed fraternity; in theory we regarded 
people as a source of inspiration and in practice we were 
suspicious of our audiences. And so on. We willed one 
thing and caused its opposite: the anarchist's dilemma! 
The members of the SO reacted strongly to our analysis. 
In particular, a passage we quoted from Christopher 
Caudwell generated considerable discussion and it 
therefore seems worth quoting it in full. 
In bourgeois society social relations are denied in 
the form of relations between men, and take the 
form of a relation between man and a thing, a 
property relation, which , because it is a dominating 
relation, is believed to make men free. But this is an 
illusion. The property relation is only a disguise for 
relations which now become unconscious and 
1 Phrases quoted from the Scratch Orchestra's 'Discontent File'. 
therefore anarchic but are still between man and 
man, and in particular between exploiter and ex-
ploited . 
The artist in bourgeois culture is asked to do the 
same thing. He is asked to regard the art work as a 
finished commodity and the process of art as a 
relation between himself and the work, which then 
disappears into the market. There is a further 
relation between the art work and the buyer, but 
with this he can hardly be concerned. The whole 
pressure of bourgeois society is to make him regard 
the art work as hypostatised and his relation to it as 
primarily that of a producer for the market. 
This will have two results. 
(i) The mere fact that he has to earn his living 
by the sale of the concrete hypostatised entity as· 
a property right - copyright, picture, statue -
may drive him to estimate his work as an artist 
by the market chances which produce a high 
total return for these property rights. This leads 
to the commercialisation or vulgarisation of art. 
(ii) But art is not in any case a relation to a thing, it 
is a relation between men, between artist and 
audience, and the art work is only like a machine 
which they must both grasp as part of the 
process. The commercialisationo(artmayrevolt 
the sincere artist, but the tragedy is that he 
revolts against it still within the limitations of 
bourgeois culture. He attempts to forget the 
market completely and concentrate on his rela-
tion to the art work, which now becomes still 
further hypostatised as an entity-in-itself. 
Because the art work is now completely an end-
in-itself, and even the market is forgotten, the 
art process becomes an extremely in-
dividualistic relation. The social values inherent 
in the art form, such as syntax, tradition, rules , 
technique, form, accepted tonal scale, now seem 
to have little value, for the art work more and 
more exists for the individual alone. The art 
work is necessarily always the product of a 
tension between old conscious social for-
mulations - the art 'form' - and new in-
dividual experience made conscious - the art 
'content' or the artist's 'message'. This is the 
synthesis, the specifically hard task of creation. 
But the hypostatisation of the art work as the 
goal makes old conscious social formulations 
less and less important, and individual ex-
perience more and more dominating. As a result 
art becomes more and more formless, personal 
and individualistic, culminating in Dadaism, 
surrealism and 'Steinism'.2 
The SO responded to this text because it summed up not 
only their own position but that of their contemporaries. 
too. Many members agreed that if a solution to the 
problem was to be found, it would have to be within the 
political sphere. In finally recognising that the ideological 
factor in art was of fundamental importance, the SO 
delivered a crushing blow to the theory of 'art for art's 
sake', an idea with which the orchestra had hitherto 
managed to coexist. Political links were sought and the 
SO no longer existed as an autonomous artistic organisa-
tion. Study groups were set up to read the Marxist classics 
and those who supported the politicisation of the SO 
embarked on a course of self-education. The others (and 
it was about 50/ 50) drifted away to pursue their own 
artistic interests on an individual basis. Speaking for 
myself, I decided to read and study, and to think more and 
play less. This was not a hard decision because I no longer 
felt a strong commitment to a large part of the contem-
porary repertoire, for the reasons stated or implied in the 
passage quoted from Caudwell. 
What follows below is a conglomeration of doubts and 
dogma which inform my present attitude not only to 
experimental music but to all music. The general nature 
of these considerations also reflects my stance against the 
idea of the autonomy of music. 
2 Christopher Caudwell, The Concept of Freedom (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1965), pp. 11-13. 
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THE IDEOLOGICAL FACTOR 
A study of music presupposes a study of man. Art is an 
active socio-historical process produced by the tension 
between changing social relations and outmoded con-
sciousness. Works of art do not drop out of the heavens 
into the minds of geniuses. Nor can any individual work 
of art claim eternal life. A study of the re-creation of 
works of art is as necessary and illuminating as a study of 
their creation. True, Greek art survives, but nothing 
survives in the same form. Greek art as the Greeks 
understood it is dead because Greek society is dead. 
Means and relations of production determine men's 
ways of life and condition, which in turn determine their 
psychology, their modes of thought and emotional make-
up. These factors determine their works of art; social 
psychology is expressed in works of art as the cultural 
tastes of a given period. 
Every poetical work is an integral unity, in which 
sounds, ideas, imagery, etc. are component parts 
synthetically united. On the other hand, it is also a 
unity from the sociological viewpoint, since all the 
component parts and their synthesis taken together 
are ideological reflexes of a definite period and a 
definite class . 3 
CLASS 
Much remains incomprehensible if we ignore class 
relations and class struggle. The artist will necessarily 
integrate the experience and voice the consciousness of 
that group whose experience in general resembles his 
own. Moreover, it is through social experience that our 
class attitudes can be changed: the individual psychology 
is a social creation. Beethoven was an ardent republican 
whose music served as a kind of rallying point, a sense of 
common experience and kinship, for all anti-feudal 
minds, for all who welcomed the conflicts of the time and 
found progress in them. Still in the context of class 
antagonisms, art can be used by one class as a weapon to 
help subjugate another. Writing in the 30s, Caudwell 
described _:_ "Bad" art , "affective massage" which is 
offered to the masses, arouses and satisfies the instincts 
without expanding consciousness, perhaps even deaden-
ing consciousness, thus helping to keep people adjusted to 
an unpleasant economic situation. '4 It thus thrives on the 
immaturity of its audience, hence the youthful appeal of 
much bad pop music. There are also examples of 
elaborate, 'high-falutin" contemporary art music which 
fall into the same category and to which I shall refer later. 
In terms of the appreciation and even the definition of 
music, members of a social group are taught what is 
considered good or bad music, beautiful or ugly music 
and proper behaviour towards music; for example, some 
groups listen to music in silence, others engage in all kinds 
of .noisy activity while listening. In this sense, aesthetic 
emotion is deeply influenced by social and cultural 
factors, insofar as some people have learned from other 
people what to listen for in musical sounds and patterns: 
they are taught the language. It follows that conceptions 
of music as a 'universal language' are wholly idealistic. 
What is regarded as 'music' and what qualities are 
ascribed to it are matters of social convention which vary 
in time, in geographical location and according to class. 
At a school in the East End of London, children 
bracketed together most of the Western art music of the 
last 400 years and described it as 'bleedin' opera'. A piece 
like Debussy's La Mer they did not regard as being music 
at all. This phenomenon cannot be understood simply in 
terms of the children's 'ignorance'; ideas about music are 
intertwined with and underpinned by more general ideas 
3 From an address given by N. l. Bukharin to the First Soviet 
Writers' Congress, published in English in 1935 and quoted in 
David N. Margolies, The Function of Literature: a Study of 
Christopher Caudwell's Aesthetics (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1969), p. 96. 
4 Quoted in Margolies, op. cit., p. 108. 
and beliefs with regard to other spheres of life, such as 
religion, work and leisure. They are also related to 
concepts of morality, human dignity and utility. 
MUSIC AND IDEAS 
I cannot agree with Hans Keller - whose messianic belief 
in the autonomy of music has led, quite logically, to his 
'wordless analysis' - that the 'laws of musical thought 
are definably different from the laws of conceptual 
thought'.5 In fact I doubt that any such line of demarca-
tion can be drawn up : the boundaries between musical 
and conceptual thought are fluid and music therefore 
enjoys a relative, not an absolute autonomy. To be sure, 
the ideas which music embodies are not 
the ideas which may be found in a scientific tract, 
but commentaries on a society showing what it 
means to live in it. They embrace developments in 
sensitivity, in the human's awareness of his own 
powers, and in the situation of internal freedom, as 
conditions change in the external world. In this way 
music joins the other arts in creating social con-
sciousness, or the individual's awareness of the 
internal life he shares with society, and in revealing 
the internal history of society.6 
Non-musical ideas, ways of thinking, even whole 
philosophies, inform musical composition. A definite 
relationship can be shown to exist between mechanical 
materialism and post-Second World War serialism. 
Mechanical materialism regards nature as a passive 
object, not as something subject to man's activity or the 
antagonist of his striving, but as something self-con-
tained, shut in by its own necessities. On the one hand 
there is man, the subject, desirous, active, spontaneous 
and free; on the other there is the object, nature as known 
by man, a machine contemplated in splendid isolation. 
Thus subject and object are mechanically separated; their 
dialectical (that is, mutually determining) relationship is 
ignored. Mechanical materialism acknowledges the ex-
istence of the objective world but sees man's relationship 
with it as a one-way affair. 
The parallel with serial composition is striking. Accor-
ding to the post-war serialist composer, his composition is 
a piece of nature obeying determinate laws (the series) so 
designed as to satisfy his wants (his artistic conscience) 
and to create use-value (for the art market). This self-
contained work of nature fulfils a 'plan'; the plan is the 
composer's desire. The serialist composer cannot imagine 
himself free if the spontaneity of human desire on the one 
hand and the independent mechanism of nature on the 
other are in any way infringed. This preoccupation with 
the perfection of the object led to total serialism, where 
the performer was supposed to reproduce mathematically 
precise notations faithfully. But what happened was that 
the increasing demands of the notation engendered a 
proportionally increasing inaccuracy in performance. 
The contradiction was insoluble; the 'solution' which was 
eventually found merely intensified the composer's dilem-
ma. By an iron logic, preoccupation with the object was 
transformed into preoccupation with the self, as in the 
cases of Stockhausen and, in a more subtle way, Cage : 
from Stockhausen's first four Klavierstilcke (1953-54) to 
Aus den sieben Tagen (1968); from Cage's Music of 
Changes (1951-52) to his highly subjective dictum -
'Listen - _you will hear music. Perform - you will make 
music.'7 So the contemporary composer (and here we are 
talking about probably the two most influential living 
composers) abandons the object and seeks refuge and 
resolution in the subject (idealism, subjectivism, 'doing 
your own thing' and so on). 
5 Hans Keller, 1975 (1984 minus 9) (London: Dobson, 1978), 
p. 141. 
6 Sidney Finkelstein, How Music Expresses Ideas (New York: 
International Publishers, 1976), p. 11. 
7 John Cage, Silence (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I .T. Press, 1966). 
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In both Stockhausen and Cage there is a remarkable 
consistency between their writings and their music. The 
writings render verbally explicit the ideas expressed in the 
music. For example, Cage's atomistic world outlook 
clearly relates to his compositional method for the Music 
for Piano series composed between 1951 and 1964 (ran-
dom, individual notes and random relationships). That 
these two composers have an ideological standpoint 
cannot be denied , though its interpretation is naturally a 
matter for debate. 
To some, my interpretation of Stockhausen's music 
and the metaphysical jargon in which he presents his ideas 
verbally may seem hardboiled and ungracious, but when 
the late Mao Tse-Tung described idealism and 
metaphysics as ' the easiest things in the world , because 
people can talk as much nonsense as they like without 
basing it on objectivity or having it tested against reality ',S 
he hit the nail on the head. The banality of, say, Hymnen 
(1966-67) or Klavierstiick IX (1954-61) (which Cardew 
rightly described as a 'weak, aesthetic version' of Young's 
X for Henry Flynt9} corroborates one's worst suspicions. 
I therefore cannot take the idea of 'communion with 
the supernatural' at its face value; Stockhausen invokes it , 
I suggest, precisely because communion with the real 
world is impossible for him. 10 Similarly 'a vehicle to 
discover their inner selves' is, on the contrary, a vehicle to 
intensify the audience's feelings of separation, isolation 
and alienation from their fellow human beings. ' Discover 
what they have forgotten about themselves' exemplifies 
the old romantic yearning for a paradise lost, and the 
reference to going 'through the eye of a needle' is similarly 
a regression, the dream of returning to the primitive state. 
And when Stockhausen refers to the 'spirit of the cosmos ' 
as a source of knowledge and enlightenment, I suggest 
that we would be more likely to be able to determine the 
origin and context of many of his ideas if we were to 
investigate the spirit of the art market and in particular 
the characteristic 'star' system that forms an integral part 
of it. 
Cage's world outlook is quite explicit and there is no 
need to spell it out here. My point is that far from being an 
autonomous art, music expresses ideas about the world 
and it is just those composers whose music 
ideas in a convincing fashion who are taken up 
by soctety. Marx and Engels make clear the wider context 
in which this takes place: 
Insofar, therefore, as [the ruling class] rule as a 
class and determine the extent and compass of an 
epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole 
range, hence among other things rule also as 
thinkers, as producers of ideas , and regulate the 
production and distribution of the ideas of their 
age : thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the 
epoch.'' 
T? discover other reasons for the propagation of the 
mustc of these composers, a note-by-note analysis may 
provide part of the answer but certainly not the whole 
truth; greater insights will be gained if we examine the 
effect of the music, its social role and its consequences. 1 
do not believe in the neutrality of music. Neither did 
Beethoven, who expressed the wish that if social con-
ditions were improved, his art should be used for the good 
of the poor. Nor did Schoenberg, who said 'I think 
8 Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign 
Language Press, 1966), p. 2 12. 
9 Cornelius Cardew, 'One Sound: La Monte Young', The Musical 
Times, vol. 107, no. 1485 (November 1966), p. 959. 
10 'Spiritual Dimensions: Peter Heyworth talks to Karlheinz 
Stockhausen', Music and Musicians, vol. 19, no. 9 (May 1971), 
pp. 32-39. 
11 Kart Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology Part One, 
with Selections from Parts Two and Three, together with Marx's 
'Introduction to a CritiqueofPo/itica/Economy', ed. C. J. Arthur 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1974), pp. 64-65. 
[composers] are in the first instance fighters for their own 
musical ideas. The ideas of other composers are their 
enemies.' 12 
INDIVIDUALISM AND THE POLITICAL FACTOR 
The previous quote is a militantly individualistic state-
ment. First of all, let us not confuse 'individualism' with 
'individuality'. They are not interchangeable. There is a 
world of difference between 'individuality' (strongly 
marked individual character) and 'individualism' (self-
centred conduct, feeling; egoism), and we can therefore 
distinguish between the 'individuality' of the Eroica 
Symphony, the inoffensive 'individualism' of Schubert's 
JYinterreise and the extreme 'individualism', the solip-
Sism of Stockhausen's Aus den sieben Tagen. 
On the Left the critique of 'individualism' is this : that 
one man's individualism is another man's de-in-
d!v!dual!sa.tion. For example, an extremely in-
diVIdualistic score can lead to frustration and despair on 
the part of the would-be performer. And if audiences are 
bored or alienated it is often the individualism of much 
contemporary music that renders it unintelligible. But 
there is a political issue at stake here of fundamental 
performance. Ideologues of the Right (Christopher 
Booker, Paul Johnson, Hans Keller, Bernard Levin) have 
introduced a simplistic, individualistic/ collectivist 
dualism. On this basis these gentlemen and their allies and 
masters in the media are laying siege to the collective 
ethos as part of an overall political strategy. The aim is to 
undermine and weaken the unity of purpose and the 
collective action which have been of necessity the modus 
vivendi of the majority. Keller, the musician, seems 
overwhelmed by a kind of panic or hysteria with the 
inevitable Freudian overtones: he writes of'. . the new 
c.ommitment to collectivism, its regression to 
mfantJle depersonalisatiOn and dehumanisation un-
noticed by the victim ... multiple regressions to group 
and gang behaviour under quasi-parental protection'.U 
What this outburst typifies is a class reflex to Left politics 
and in particular to Marxism, which E. P. Thompson 
described in The Observer last year in reply to an article 
by Conor Cruise O'Brien: 
I find Dr. O'Brien's lampoons against undefined 
Marxists, his tabloid style, his roads to ruin and his 
abyss, the tell-tale signs of an on-coming grande 
pe.ur: Historians have not invented the gran de peur, 
a event, a psycho-social class spasm of 
matwnahty analogous to the displaced sense of 
'threat' in the neurotic personality. When it comes 
it can claim many victims, but the first victim of its 
formless passions is always the reason. 14 
We can see clearly, too, how Keller's politics inform his 
judg:ments on music, and his book 1975 (1984 minus 9) 
provides examples of the following variety: 'The 
metaphysical and / or psychological / operatic composer's 
utterances are of individual discoveries, whereas the 
•. and quite especially the neo-Marxist, makes a 
collectiVIst statement for the purpose of propaganda. •ts 
Perhaps, on reflection, the sheer intellectual crudity of 
this embarrassed Keller, for in another passage 
he tnes to free Nono and Shostakovich from the 
' professed truth', the 'transpersonal dogma ' of Marxism 
and the. stupid masses: 'It follows ruthlessly that ail 
Marxist music that does not go beyond its intentions (as 
12 Arnold Schoenberg, Letters, ed. Erwin Stein, trans. Ellhne 
Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), 
p. 265. 
13 Hans Keller, 'Thinkers of the World, Disunite!', part 3, Books 
and Book men, vol. 21, no. I (October 1975), p. 57 (part I in vol. 
20, no. 9 (June 1975), pp. 27-31; part 2 in vol. 20, no. 12 
(September 1975), pp. 15-17). 
14 The Observer (February 4, 1979). 
15 Hans Keller, 1975 ( 1984 minus 9) , p. 254. 
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Nono's or Henze's or, of course, Shostakovich's does) is 
music by the stupid for the collectively stupefied.' 16 Add 
Hanns Eisler to the group and Keller would probably 
spirit his Marxism away too: no easy task! After a recent 
performance of Eisler's chamber cantata On the death of 
a Comrade (1935), I reflected on its attitude towards the 
individual. Brecht's text is concerned with the individual 
and others not opposed or but as a unity : 'To 
be together without fear, that's the start. We must stay 
together and must not allow ourselves to be separated ... 
Truth and brotherhood shall replace the rule of lies.' 17 
Brecht describes the death of an individual whose last 
thoughts embraced others. By contrast, Keller and other 
ideologues of the Right isolate and idealise the 
'individual', who is separated from and opposed to 
'others'. This dualism is precisely what characterises the 
relation of the contemporary composer and his audience. 
THE RELATION OF MUSIC AND SOCIETY 
In his paper on 'Music Historiography in Eastern 
Europe', Georg Knepler, an East German musicologist 
made the following observation: ' 
Neither the common chord nor the prohibition of 
parallel fifths can be directly deduced from the 
conditions of the society in which they 
nor can they be separated from that 
soctety and reduced, say, to the workings of eternal 
laws of nature. 18 
The relation of art to society is a formidable subject but 
part ?fa Engels wrote in 1894 might serve as a 
startmg pomt. 
!he particular sphere which we are 
mvestigatmg IS removed from the economic sphere 
and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the 
more we shall find it exhibiting accidents in its 
the more its curve will run in a zig-
zag. But tf you plot the average axis of the curve, 
you will find that this axis will run more and more 
nearly parallel to the axis of economic development 
the longer the period considered and the wider the 
field dealt with. 19 
What these two statements imply is that a highly complex 
of psychological, cultural, ideological and 
econom1c phenomena has to be taken into account in 
dea.ling not only with the art in general of a particular 
penod but also with the individual art work. For 
the notion of'objective and subjective culture' is 
particularly relevant to present-day society where there is 
an abundance of musics to enjoy. 'Objective and 
denotes what is objectively available at 
any g1ven h1stoncal moment and to what extent social 
classes, groups and individuals make use of this 
availability. 
ANALYSING MUSIC 
The fact that enjoys only a relative autonomy, that 
an category underpins all form and 
content, 1s anathema the positivism of contemporary 
analysts wh.o t;eat a self-contained, closed entity. 
The 1s s1mply by showing the various 
harmomc, motiVIC and textural relationships within it. 
All the motivic.material is derived from within the piece 
and the source 1s somewhere at the beginning. As befits a 
16 Ibid., p. 255. 
17 Trans. by John Tilbury of the text of Hanns Eisler, Vier 
Cantaten (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1973), pp. 22-23. 
18 Perspectives in Musicology, ed. Barry S. Brook and others (New 
York: W. W. Norton, cl972), p. 231. 
19 Letter from Friedrich Engels to H. Starkenburg, January 25, 
1894, Kart Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Correspondence, 
ed. S. Ryazanskaya, trans. I. Lasker (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 2nd edn, 1965), p. 468. 
positivist analysis the source or 'basic theme' is regarded 
as 'given'; that is to say, it is left out of the analysis. There 
is rarely any attempt at a genetic investigation of the 
source material; the point of commencement, the 'zero 
situation' of a composition is ignored by the positivist 
analysts. But if, as Schoenberg claimed, the genius learns 
only from himself, then only the heavens can lie beyond 
the masterpiece and the lowly analyst finds himself 
analysing an immaculate conception. 
Suppose, however, we adopted the methods and the 
impartiality of ethnomusicology and abandoned our 
overblown and presumptuous theories of genius and 
'universal music', which play no part in the history offolk 
music (or can it be that throughout the centuries the poor 
have produced no musical genius?); suppose we viewed 
the musical achievements of our own barbarous tribe as 
dispassionately as we do those of the Yoruba of West 
Africa, among whom works of art appear clearly as 
products of society rather than as personal creations. 
If such methods and approaches enabled us to describe 
the social function and the socio-psychological function 
of art music in Western society, they would already have 
answered questions of fundamental importance. 
LISTENING TO MUSIC 
To most people music implies at least two levels of 
articulation, each of which is comprehended or simply 
thrown into relief by reference to the other. This 
referential process lies at the heart of our musical 
comprehension. The first level is found precisely in the 
hierarchical structure of socially evolved musical scales 
constituting something analogous to language. The 
elements of the second level -the choice or arrangement 
of sounds according to a given technique or style - must 
already be endowed with meaning. They must have been 
systematised at the first level so that there are a priori 
conditions of communication. The first level consists of 
real, if unconscious relations. The modernist composer, 
however, has abandoned the first level of articulation and 
attempts to operate on only one level. Thus there is no 
referential system as in modal and tonal music, or the 
music of all other known cultures. What is the effect of 
this on the listener? One strives to share in the music's 
impulse, to respond to the power of its internal logic. But 
in this music the impulse often appears arbitrary and the 
logic is that of a game. The harmony has no discernible 
structural function, as in tonal music, and the melodic 
elements are now being asked to play a more fundamental 
role to compensate for the loss of syntax. If the piece is to 
succeed, these elements must be invested with 
extraordinary significance, a superhuman feat which 
perhaps only Schoenberg has achieved with any 
consistency, and this probably because of the traumatic 
nature of his message. 20 
THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE 
then are tasks facing committed young 
m_ustctans today? Etsler recounts a story of his encounter 
wtth Enghsh composers in London in 1961 on the 
occasiOn ..Qf a performance of his Deutsche Sinfonie 
(1934:47).21 During his. stay in England, Eisler met several 
promt.nent Y.oung composers and listened to tapes 
of mustc .. dtfferences between the pieces seemed 
to htm to be mmtmal; they were all basically on the 'doom 
and gloom' theme, sometimes made explicit through 
words. Tempos were largo, poco largo, molto largo and 
so on. When an andante passage came along Eisler was 
delighted. These were gifted young people with a real 
2° For a more extended critique of serialism on these lines see 
Claude Levi-Strauss, 'Overture', The Raw and the Cooked, 
trans. John and Doreen Weightman (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1969); see also the admirable theory of foreground and 
background in music in Keller, 1975 (1984 minus 9). 
21 Hanns Eisler, Materia/en zu einer Dia/ektik der Musik (Leipzig: 
Reclam, 1976), pp. 307-309. 
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feeling for musical sound, but at one point he felt obliged 
to tell one young man that his music was so unremittingly 
sad he could hardly bear to hear any more. He asked him 
to go away and write an allegro, suggesting that with so 
much sadness his music was too one-sided. When the 
composer insisted that he was incapable of writing an 
allegro, Eisler told him to go for a walk and observe the 
world and that he would find an allegro. He probably did 
not intend his words to be taken literally but we can see 
what he was driving at. Unfortunately few of our 
composers today have heeded Eisler's advice. On the 
contrary, they wring their hands in despair, or worse still 
they create a fantasy world of game-like activity which 
provides a precarious retreat where they can hide not only 
from the real world but also from their real selves. I have 
heard some contemporary allegros, but the music has 
usually been silly and I do not think that is what Eisler had 
in mind. He once wrote: 
A composer is not 'progressive' simply because he 
uses the twelve-note method. The content of his 
music must be progressive. This means that the 
composer, through his music, must address himself 
to the problems of contemporary society.22 
The student, too, through his study of music, should 
address himself to those problems. I have already 
intimated the kind of musical study I believe would bear 
fruit. Investigate the content of music. How can the 
history, sociology, psychology and the analysis and 
aesthetics of music be made to ask each other more exact 
questions? Should not students spend less time and 
energy on analysing the note-to-note procedure of 
Maxwell Davies's Symphony and considerably more time 
on trying to understand why contemporary British 
culture needs and promotes certain composers, and why, 
for example, the performance of a new Symphony, 
unloved by millions, should warrant publicity on national 
television news? Form study groups and organise 
seminars. Review the various critiques of current and 
fashionable trends in contemporary music. Initiate a 
reassessment of serialism, for example, with reference to 
its proponents (Schoenberg, Leibowitz, Perle, Rufer, 
etc.) and to its critics (Bush, Cardew, Eisler, Hindemith, 
U:vi-Strauss, Marothy, etc.). Always know the object of 
criticism. Never degenerate into philistinism. Subject 
your ideas to the criterion of practice. A lot of talk about 
art is abstract and formalist. It is tempting to use 
abstractions to obscure the true nature of our musical 
activity and they form a kind of escape route from the real 
world. We can dream of cosmopolitan audiences, 
universal music and posterity, but these are question-
begging concepts. For what audience are we performing? 
Whose needs does this music serve? For what kind of 
'posterity' am I composing? 
Look for ways in which you can serve your local 
community with music. For example, there are plenty of 
old people's clubs you could contact. But never play down 
to people: talk about the music, create a congenial 
atmosphere and try to raise standards. If you have a 
political commitment to the Left, contact political 
societies at universities and trade union groups, and offer 
programmes containing some works with more explicit 
political content (Berio, Britten, Bush, Cardew, Eisler, 
Henze, Nono, Prokofiev, Rzewski, Shostakovich, Wolff) 
and initiate discussion. Above all, put your music to use. 
Finally, in the light of my previous comments, I guess it 
would not be hard to deduce my present attitude towards 
experimental music. My disenchantment began when it 
finally dawned on me that this music bore precious little 
relation to the real world. Primarily its relation was to 
other music to which it responded at best with wit, charm 
and irony (as in the work of Gavin Bryars, Howard 
Skempton and John White) or at worst with a shrug, a 
giggle or a raspberry. 
22 Ibid. , p. 135. 
Bryars has correctly observed that much experimental 
music does not involve compositional argument. This 
lack of musical argument reflects the quietist philosophy 
which constitutes an important ideological component of 
experimental music. It presents a fa,;:ade of neutrality, of 
disinterestedness, a 'take it or leave it' stance which is 
disarming. To attack it is like attacking a defenceless 
person, unless of course one considers its apparent 
neutrality a sham. In the 60s many composers of 
experimental music moved towards repetition and 
'harmony', creating a haven for disenchanted musicians 
within the new flower culture, a rallying-point for drop­
outs who required from music a more developed, more 
sophisticated aesthetic than pop music provided. 
[!1 
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Experimental music provides therapy; it has no other 
role because it is not developmental. It provides a certain 
content which is in demand, and in this sense it has 
cornered part of the contemporary music market. The 
rich and complex psychological states of previous music 
(of, say, late Beethoven) are ironed out, 'normalised', 
made fashionable to fit smugly with the anaesthetised 
demands of an average culture. The modern audience 
above all demands therapy and so extracts from a work 
that which may serve a therapeutic purpose. In the case of 
experimental music the reductive process has already 
been completed by the composer, the music is pre­
packaged and the customer receives the prescribed form 
of satisfaction. 
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